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Abstract
It is argued that there are interesting cases in which two axiomatic systems syntactically and se-
mantically non-trivially different in the standard sense are rather to be classified as only trivially
different. For a strict comparison of the systems of such a kind the generalized concepts of syntac-
tically and semantically trivial differences are formally defined. As an example, it is shown that an
instant-based time system and a period-based time system sketched in the paper are just trivially
different in the defined sense in spite of the fact that, contrary to Quine’s famous requirement, the
variables of the two systems can never range over the elements of one and the same basic set. What
is the same in relation to both systems is time topology.
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By comparing first-order axiomatic systems according to Quine’s semantical formula
‘To be assumed as an entity [. . .] is to be reckoned as the value of a variable’ [17, p. 13],
one should say that two axiomatic systems not interpretable in such a way that variables of
one of them and the variables of the other one range over the elements of one and the same
basic sets are both syntactically and semantically non-trivially different.
However, there are interesting cases in which two systems different in the cited sense are
more naturally to be taken as only trivially different. That’s why more generalized concepts
of syntactical and semantical differences are needed. It will be shown of what importance
they can be for comparing rival ontologies.
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1. Let us consider two simple first-order systems S1 and S2. S1 contains x1 and x2 as
the only two individual variable symbols and = as the only relation symbol. S2 contains
y1 and y2 as the only two individual variable symbols and D as the only relation symbol.
Let the elementary wffs of S1 be x1 = x1, x1 = x2, x2 = x1, x2 = x2 and the elementary
wffs of S2 be Dy1y1, Dy1y2, Dy2y1, Dy2y2, the complex wffs being introducable in an
obvious way by adding logical constants and quantifiers. Let the axiom scheme of S1 be
(xn)¬xn = xn (n = 1,2) and the axiom scheme of S2 be (yn)¬Dynyn (n = 1,2) (in ad-
dition to the axioms of propositional and predicate calculi). S1 and S2 are syntactically
only trivially different because there is a set of syntactic constraints, C, which provides
a translation of each wff of S1 into just one wff of S2, and vice versa, such that each
theorem of S1 is translated into just one theorem of S2, and vice versa. (If the two lan-
guages in which S1 and S2 are formulated are not to be mixed, all wffs of one of the two
systems should be replaced at the same time through the corresponding wffs of the other
one.)
In view of the intended generalization, it should be noted that the mutual interchange-
ability between all the wffs of S1 and all the wffs of S2 is based on a 1–1 mapping of
each variable symbol of one of the two systems to a variable symbol of the other one, say
of x1 to y1 and x2 to y2, so that the base for the recursive definition of all syntactic con-
straints providing interchangeability can be introduced as xm = xn =C Dymyn (m= 1,2;
n= 1,2),=C meaning that the formulae flanking it on each side are interchangeable under
C-constraints (translation rules).
From a semantical point of view, S1 and S2 are equivalent in relation to the two respec-
tive classes of their models, because each relational structure that is a model for S1 is a
model for S2, and vice versa.
Now, the interesting cases we are looking for are those cases in which there is no such
thing possible as a complete mutual translatability between the wffs of two (complete first-
order) systems S and S′ based on one set of syntactic constraints alone, but where there
are still two recursively definable sets of mutually non-inverse translation rules C and C∗
(based on mappings of each variable of S to just one variable tuple of S′ and of each
variable of S′ to just one variable tuple of S), such that all the wffs of S as well as all the
wffs of S′ are translatable according to C and C∗ respectively, the theorems being always
translated into theorems and non-theorems into non-theorems. A concrete example will
be formally elaborated in Section 2. In this section shall cite the necessary and sufficient
conditions that are to be met in relation to any two complete first-order axiomatic systems
containing denumerable infinite sets of variables if the systems are to be understood as
syntactically and semantically trivially different in a non-standard yet generalized sense,
which doesn’t mean that the same idea is not naturally extendable to other kinds of systems
too.
Supposition 1. Let L be a family of complete first-order languages, each of the languages
containing a set of individual variable symbols and predicate/relation symbols in addition
to logical constants and quantifiers.
Let us pick out from L a pair of languages, L and L′, whose respective sets of variable
symbols are V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn, . . .} and V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′n, . . .}, and whose respec-
M. Arsenijevic´ / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 1–12 3
tive sets of wffs are F = {F1,F2, . . . ,Fn, . . .} and F ′ = {F ′,F ′, . . . ,F ′n, . . .}, where for1 2
V and V ′ two variable symbol mappings f and f ∗ and for F and F ′ two related sets of
syntactic constraints C and C∗ are definable as follows:
f is a 1–1 mapping of each variable symbol of L to a (k+ 1)-tuple of variable symbols
of L′, whereas f ∗ is a 1–1 mapping of each variable symbol of L′ to a (l + 1)-tuple of
variable symbols of L (k > 0, l > 0), namely:
f :vn →〈v′m,v′m+1, . . . , v′m+k〉, where for n= 1,2,3, . . . , i, . . . , m= 1, k+ 2,
2k+ 3, . . . , (i − 1)k + 1, . . . resp. (k > 0),
f ∗ :v′n →〈vm, vm+1, . . . , vm+l〉, where for n= 1,2,3, . . . , i, . . . , m= 1, l + 2,
2l+ 3, . . . , (i − 1)l+ 1, . . . resp. (l > 0);
C is a set of syntactic constraints, related to f , defining a 1–1 translation of each wff
from F into a wff from F ′ in a standard recursive way so that for each i and Fi ∈F :
Fi(vn, vn+p1 , vn+p2 , . . . , vn+pq )
=C F ′j
(
f (vn), f (vn+p1), f (vn+p2), . . . , f (vn+pq )
)
for some F ′j ∈F ′, where
• Fi(vn, vn+p1 , vn+p2 , . . . , vn+pq ) denotes Fi and indicates in numerical order (in the
parentheses) all and only variable symbols which occur in Fi (p1,p2, . . . , pq being
integers such that −1 p1  p2  · · · pq);
• F ′j (f (vn), f (vn+p1), f (vn+p2), . . . , f (vn+pq )) denotes some F ′j from F ′ which con-
tains all and only variable symbols from the tuples to which the variable symbols from
Fi are mapped according to f ;
• =C connects Fi and F ′j by stating that F ′j is to be taken as just that wff which is
obtained from Fi according to C.
• The set of syntactic constraints C∗, providing a translation of each wff from F ′ into
just one wff from F , is to be understood analogously to C.
It is important to notice that, since f and f ∗ are mappings of variable symbols to
(k + 1)-tuples and (l + 1)-tuples, where k  1 and l  1, the translations under C and
C∗ are translations of all the wffs from F into (not onto) F ′ and of all the wffs from F ′ into
(not onto) F respectively, C and C∗ being necessarily non-inverse.
Supposition 2. Let two axiomatic systems S and S′ be built up by introducing two sets
of axioms A and A′ into L and L′ respectively, both A and A′ containing as their proper
subsets all axioms of the propositional and predicate calculi. (The derivation rules are sup-
posed to be standard derivation rules of the propositional and quantification calculi.) Let
it be supposed that under f , f ∗, C, C∗ from Supposition 1 each theorem of S is trans-
lated into a theorem of S′ as well as each theorem of S′ into a theorem of S and that no
non-theorem of S is translated into a theorem of S′ as well as no non-theorem of S′ into a
theorem of S.
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If Suppositions 1 and 2 are satisfied, a curious situation arises. Although not all of the
wffs from F ′ are obtainable from F and not all of the wffs from F are obtainable from F ′
under the two sets of translation rules, F contains as its proper subset all the wffs from
F ′ translated into F , and F ′ contains as its proper subset all the wffs from F translated
into F ′, the theorems always being translated into theorems and the non-theorems into
non-theorems. But, however curious this can be, it is the latter fact, and not the former, that
seems decisive for classifying S and S′ as syntactically only trivially different systems (in
the generalized sense), vindicating the following definition:
Definition 1. Any two complete axiomatic systems S and S′, expressed in two different
languages L and L′ from the family of first-order languages L, where L and L′ are not
trivially different languages in the standard sense, are syntactically trivially different in
the generalized sense if both Suppositions 1 and 2 are satisfied in relation to L, L′, S
and S′.
Turning to the question of interpretation of systems S and S′ syntactically trivially dif-
ferent in the generalized sense, one should notice that (1) although variables of one of them
can range over the elements of the basic set in no model of the other one and although syn-
tactic constraints C and C∗ are not inverse, (2) S is interpretable under C in any relational
structure (if there is any) in which S′ is satisfied as well as S′ is interpretable under C∗ in
any relational structure (if there is any) in which S is satisfied. Now, is it the former fact
(due to which the Quinean slogan is not satisfied) or is it the latter one that is to be taken as
decisive for the question of whether two systems syntactically trivially different in the gen-
eralized sense (according to Definition 1) are also to be taken as semantically only trivially
different (in the generalized sense) in relation to the respective classes of their models?
The answer to this question seems to require some kind of informal philosophical argu-
ment, which is going to be dealt with in Section 3. At this stage we shall simply classify
such systems as semantically trivially different in the generalized sense in relation to the
respective classes of their models, where the qualification ‘in the generalized sense’ is to be
understood technically, as meaning just that each of the two systems syntactically trivially
different according to Definition 1 is always interpretable in a corresponding model of the
other one after an appropriate translation. Therefore:
Definition 2. Two systems having models and being syntactically trivially different accord-
ing to Definition 1 are semantically trivially different in the generalized sense in relation
to the two respective classes of their models.
It is easy to see how the standard conception of syntactically and semantically triv-
ial differences related to the first-order systems can be obtained as a special case when
only Supposition 1 is slightly changed as to be satisfied under syntactic constraints which
are inverse, the translations of all the wffs of L into wffs of L′ and of all the wffs of L′
into wffs of L being then 1–1 mappings of F onto F ′ and of F ′ onto F respectively.
Actually, k and l from the above definitions of f and f ∗ should be taken to be equal to
zero.
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2. The importance of the above generalizations will be now illustrated with an intrigu-
ing example concerning ‘the great struggle’ about the structure of time,1 one of the two
parties holding instants, the other one periods as its basic stuffs.2
For the sake of simplicity I shall use the axiomatization whose models are perfect but
not coherent sets in Cantor’s sense3.
Let SP contains—besides logical constants ¬, ⇒, ∧, ∨ and ⇔—individual variable
symbols α1, α2, . . . , αn, . . . (n= 1,2, . . .) quantifiable by universal and existential quanti-
fiers. The variables are supposed to range over durationless pointlike instants. Also let SP
contain relation symbols ≡ and <, to be interpreted as identity and precedence relation re-
spectively4. Let elementary wffs be αm ≡ αn and αm < αn (m= 1,2, . . . ; n= 1,2, . . .) and
the axiom schemes of SP be (in addition to the axioms of propositional and quantificational
logic):
(AP1) (αn)¬αn < αn;
(AP2) (αl)(αm)(αn)(αl < αm ∧ αm < αn ⇒ αl < αn);
(AP3) (αm)(αn)(αm < αn ∨ αn < αm ∨ αm ≡ αn);
(AP4) (αl)(αm)(αn)(αl ≡ αm ∧ αl < αn ⇒ αm < αn);
(AP5) (αl)(αm)(αn)(αl ≡ αm ∧ αn < αl ⇒ αn < αm);
(AP6) (αm)(∃αn)αm < αn;
(AP7) (αm)(∃αn)αn < αm;
(AP8) (αm)(αn)(αm < αn ⇒ (∃αl)(αm < αl ∧ αl < αn));
(l = 1,2, . . . ; m= 1,2, . . . ; n= 1,2, . . .).
Let SI contains—besides logical constants ¬, ⇒, ∧, ∨ and ⇔—individual variable
symbols a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . (n= 1,2, . . .) quantifiable by universal and existential quanti-
fiers. The variables are supposed to range over time-intervals with duration (periods). Also
let SP contain relation symbols=,≺,, ∩ and ⊂ , to be interpreted as identity, precedence,
abutment, overlapping and inclusion relation respectively. Let elementary wffs be am = an,
1 A ‘great struggle’ (‘ein großer Streit’) is Cantor’s expression that he used for characterizing the rivalry
between the two approaches related to the question about continua in general (cf. [10, p. 190]). Van Benthem
suggests, however, that ‘it would be a philosophical perversion to [re-]open hostilities’ [4, p. 8]. A more ambitious
task, we are now dealing with, is to show that the differences are syntactically and semantically trivial and,
therefore, ontologically inessential.
2 Due to the general acceptance of what Aristotle has denoted as ‘Zeno’s axiom’, according to which entities
of a higher dimension cannot be built up out of entities of a lower dimension (cf. [1, 1001 b 7]), the period-based
approach dominated until the second half of 19th century. After Dedekind and Cantor, the situation has changed
radically, so that now the period-based approach has still been considered revisionist (see [4, p. 2]), in spite of a
number of articles favouring this approach (cf. [7–9,13–16,18–20]). In view of what follows, the ‘great struggle’
should be considered trivialized (at least as concerning the structure of pure time—see Section 3) in relation to
any given time topology whatsoever.
3 I take ‘coherent’ to be the best translation of ‘zusammenhängand’ in the context of Cantor’s definition of
continuum (see [10, p. 194]).
4 In view of the aim to question the mentioned implication of Quine’s semantical formula, the two systems
that are to be compared are not sketched as propositional tense logic where the instants and periods are confined
to metalanguages (as in [15,18–20]), but in such a way that variables are directly interpretable as ranging over the
sets of two related sorts of entities (as in [7–9,13,14,16]).
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am ≺ an, am  an, am ∩ an, am ⊂ an (m= 1,2 . . . ; n= 1,2, . . .). In view of what follows,
it is, however, to be noted that , ∩ and ⊂ , although introduced as primitives for the sake
of a conventional characterization of period-based time structures5 as well as for the sake
of generality, are definable (at least in view of the system we are here interested in) via =
and ≺ in the following way:
am  an ⇔
def.
am ≺ an ∧¬(∃al)(am ≺ al ∧ al ≺ an),
am ∩ an ⇔
def.
(∃al)(∃ak)(al ≺ an ∧¬al ≺ am ∧ am ≺ ak ∧¬an ≺ ak),
am ⊂ an ⇔
def.
¬am = an ∧ (al)(al ∩ am⇒ al ∩ an)
(k = 1,2, . . . ; l = 1,2, . . . ; m= 1,2, . . . ; n= 1,2, . . .).
Now, let in addition to the axioms of propositional and quantificational logic, the axiom
schemes of SI be:
(AI1) (an)¬an ≺ an;
(AI2) (ak)(al)(am)(an)(ak ≺ am ∧ al ≺ an ⇒ ak ≺ an ∨ al ≺ am);
(AI3) (am)(an)(am ≺ an⇒ am  an ∨ (∃al)(am  al ∧ al  an));
(AI4) (ak)(al)(am)(an)(ak  am ∧ ak  an ∧ al  am ⇒ al  an);
(AI5) (ak)(al)(am)(an)(ak  al ∧ al  an ∧ ak  am ∧ am  an⇒ al = am);
(AI6) (am)(∃an)am ≺ an;
(AI7) (am)(∃an)an ≺ am;
(AI8) (am)(∃an)an ⊂ am;
(k = 1,2, . . . ; l = 1,2, . . . ; m= 1,2, . . . ; n= 1,2, . . .).
Lemma 1. If 〈P ,≡∗,<∗〉  SP —α1, α2, . . . , αn, . . . ranging over the elements of P ,
and ≡ and < being interpreted as ≡∗ and <∗ respectively—then
〈′,=∗,≺∗,∗,∩∗,⊂∗〉  SI ,
given that
′ = {〈xi, xj 〉 | xi ∈ P &xj ∈ P &xi <∗ xj
}
and
〈xi, xj 〉 =∗ 〈xk, xl〉 ⇔
def.
xi ≡∗ xk ∧ xj ≡∗ xl,
〈xi, xj 〉 ≺∗ 〈xk, xl〉 ⇔
def.
xj ≡∗ xk ∨ xj <∗ xk,
〈xi, xj 〉∗ 〈xk, xl〉 ⇔
def.
xj ≡∗ xk,
〈xi, xj 〉 ∩∗ 〈xk, xl〉 ⇔
def.
xi <
∗ xk ∧ xk <∗ xj ∧ xj < xl,
〈xi, xj 〉 ⊂∗ 〈xk, xl〉 ⇔
def.
(xk <
∗ xi ∧¬xl <∗ xj )∨ (xj <∗ xl ∧¬xi <∗ xk),
5 Cf. [6, I. 3].
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a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . ranging over the elements of ′, and =, ≺, , ∩, ⊂ being interpreted
as =∗, ≺∗, ∗, ∩∗, ⊂ ∗ respectively.6
Proof. Let us check (AI1). (an)¬an ≺ an would not be satisfied in 〈′,=∗,≺∗,∗,
∩∗,⊂ ∗〉 only if there were xi , xj , xi ≺∗ xj , so that 〈xi, xj 〉 ≺∗ 〈xi, xj 〉. However, this
means, according to the above definitional equivalence concerning 〈xi, xj 〉 ≺∗ 〈xk, xl〉,
that it should be xi ≺∗ xj ∧ (xj ≡∗ xi ∨ xj <∗ xi), which is impossible, because
¬(∃am)(∃an)
(
am < an ∧ (an ≡ am ∨ an < am)
)
,
and 〈P ,≡∗,<∗〉 is supposed to be a model for SP .
It can be shown in a similar way that each of the axioms of SI is satisfied in 〈′,=∗,≺∗,

∗,∩∗,⊂ ∗〉, where for the axioms (AI2), (AI3), (AI4), (AI5) and (AI8) the cited definitions
of , ∩ and ⊂ are to be used in addition to the definitional equivalences concerning =∗,
≺∗, ∗, ∩∗, ⊂ ∗.7 ✷
Lemma 2. If 〈I ,=∗,≺∗,∗,∩∗,⊂ ∗〉  SI—a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . ranging over the elements
of I , and =, ≺, , ∩, ⊂ being interpreted as =∗, ≺∗, ∗, ∩∗, ⊂ ∗ respectively—then
〈′′,≡∗,<∗〉  SP ,
given that
′′ = {〈Mi ,Mj 〉 |Mi ⊂I &Mj ⊂I & (yi)(yj )
(yi ∈Mi &yj ∈Mj ⇒ yi ≺∗ yj )
}
and
〈Mi ,Mj 〉 ≡∗ 〈Mk,Ml〉 ⇔
def.
Mi =Mk,
〈Mi ,Mj 〉<∗ 〈Mk,Ml〉
⇔
def.
(yi)(yl)(yi ∈Mi &yl ∈Ml ⇒ yi ≺ yl &¬yi  yl),
α1, α2, . . . , αn, . . . ranging over the elements of ′′, and ≡ and < being interpreted as ≡∗
and <∗ respectively.
Proof. The proof is mutatis mutandis the same as the proof of Lemma 1. ✷
Metatheorem 1. SP and SI are syntactically trivially different in the generalized sense.
6 Due to the fact that the elements of the basic set of a model for SI are ‘stretches’ that can be treated as
‘intervals between distinct points’ only if they are not conceived as sets of points but as something unequivocally
defined by pairs of distinct points, it would be misleading in the given context to conceive periods (as in [11,12])
as closed intervals. Originally, periods should not be said to be either open or closed. However, the standard
difference between open and closed intervals can be spoken of in a period-based system too, by defining open
intervals as infinite sequences of abutting periods having a supremum or an infinum. Only then, in contrast to such
infinite sequences of periods, periods can be said to be closed intervals (cf. [2, p. 171]).
7 The two related systems being complete, the checking of the axioms suffices.
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Proof. Letf :αn →〈a2n−1, a2n〉 (n= 1,2, . . .),
f ∗ :an→〈α2n−1, α2n〉 (n= 1,2, . . .).
Let syntactic constraints C1–C5 and C∗1 –C∗5 , providing a 1–1 translation of the set of all
the wffs of SP into a subset of wffs of SI and the set of all the wffs of SI into a subset of
wffs of SP respectively, be defined as follows:
C1 αn ≡ αm =C a2n−1  a2n ∧ a2m−1  a2m ∧ a2n−1  a2m,
C2 αn < αm =C a2n−1  a2n ∧ a2m−1  a2m ∧ a2n−1 ≺ a2m ∧¬a2n−1  a2m,
C3 ¬FP =C ¬C(FP ), where FP is a wff of SP translated according to C1–C5 into wff
C(FP ) of SI ,
C4 F ′P ♥ F ′′P =C C(F ′P ) ♥ C(F ′′P ), where ♥ stands for ⇒ or ∧ or ∨ or ⇔, and F ′P and
F ′′P stand for two wffs of SP translated according to C1–C5 into two wffs of SI , C(F ′P )
and C(F ′′P ) respectively,
C5 FP
(
ϕ(Q1αn)χ(Q2αm)ψFPS (αn,αm)ω
)
=C C(FP)
(
C(ϕ)(Q1a2n−1)(Q1a2n)C(χ)(Q2a2m−1)(Q2a2m)C(ψ)
C(FPS )(a2n−1, a2n, a2m−1, a2m)C(ω)
)
,
where FP is a wff of SP and C(FP) is the wff of SI into which FP is translated accord-
ing to C1–C5 when the structures of FP and C(FP), indicated in the parentheses, are
such that:
• Q1 and Q2 stand for quantifiers,
• FPS stands for a wff of SP containing αn and αm and being translated according to
C1–C5 into wff C(FPS ) of SI containing a2n−1, an, a2m−1 and a2m,
• ϕ, χ , ψ stand either for nothing or for quantified variables and/or wffs of SP trans-
lated according to C1–C5 into C(ϕ), C(χ) and C(ψ) respectively,
• ω stands either for nothing or for a wff of SP translated according to C1–C5 into
C(ω);
C∗1 an = am =C
∗
α2n−1 < α2n ∧ α2m−1 < α2m ∧ α2n−1 ≡ α2m−1 ∧ α2n ≡ α2m,
C∗2 an ≺ am =C
∗
α2n−1 < α2n ∧ α2m−1 < α2m ∧¬α2m−1 < α2n,
C∗3 ¬FI =C
∗ ¬C∗(FI ), where FI is a wff of SI translated according to C∗1 –C∗5 into wff
C(FI ) of SP ,
C∗4 F ′I ♥ F ′′I =C
∗
C∗(F ′I )♥C∗(F ′′I ), where ♥ stands for ⇒ or ∧ or ∨ or ⇔, and F ′I and
F ′′I stand for two wffs of SI translated according to C∗1 –C∗5 into two wffs of SP , C∗(F ′I )
and C∗(F ′′I ) respectively,
C∗5 FI
(
R(Q1an)T (Q2am)UFIS (an, am)W
)
=C∗ C∗(FI)
(
C∗(R)(Q1α2n−1)(Q1α2n)C∗(T )(Q2α2m−1)(Q2α2m)C∗(U)
C∗(FIS )(α2n−1, α2n,α2m−1, α2m)C∗(W)
)
,
where FI is a wff of SI and C∗(FI) is the wff of SP into which FI is translated accord-
ing to C∗1 –C∗5 when the structures of FI and C∗(FI), indicated in the parentheses, are
such that:
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• Q1 and Q2 stand for quantifiers,
• FIS stands for a wff of SI containing an and am and being translated according to
C∗1 –C∗5 into wff C∗(FIS ) of SP containing α2n−1, αn, α2m−1 and α2m,• R, T , U stand either for nothing or for quantified variables and/or wffs of SI trans-
lated according to C∗1 –C∗5 into C∗(R), C∗(T ) and C∗(U) respectively,• W stands either for nothing or for a wff of SI translated according to C∗1 –C∗5 into
C∗(W).
Now, it can be shown that according to C1–C5 each axiom of SP is translated into a the-
orem of SI . This time, let us check (AP2). C(AP2), according to C2, C4 and C5, reads as
follows:
(a2n−1)(a2n)(a2m−1)(a2m)(a2k−1)(a2k)(a2n−1  a2n ∧ a2m−1  a2m ∧ a2n−1 ≺ a2m
∧¬a2n−1  a2m ∧ a2m−1  a2m ∧ a2k−1  a2k ∧ a2m−1 ≺ a2k ∧¬a2m−1  a2k
⇒ a2n−1  a2n ∧ a2k−1  a2k ∧ a2n−1 ≺ a2k ∧¬a2n−1  a2k).
By using Lemma 1, it is easy to see that if C(AP2) were not a theorem, there would be
some yr , ys , yt , yu, yv , yw in a model for SI so that yr ∗ ys , yu∗ yt , yv∗ yw, yr ≺∗ yt ,
not yr ∗ yt , yu ≺∗ yw , not yu ∗ yw . However, this means, by assuming that such a
model for SI is constructed on the base of a model for SP in the way in which it is done
in Lemma 1, that in that model for SP there are pairs of elements 〈xr1, xr2〉, 〈xs1, xs2〉,
〈xt1, xt2〉, 〈xu1, xu2〉, 〈xv1, xv2〉, 〈xw1 , xw2〉, which are ordered by <∗ and which correspond
to yr , ys , yt , yu, yv , yw respectively, so that xr2 <∗ xt2 , xt2 <∗ xv2 , xv2 ≡∗ xw1 and not
xr2 <
∗ xw1 , which is impossible due to the fact that (AP2) is satisfied in each model for SP.
After proving, in a similar way, that according to C1–C5 each axiom of SP is translated
into a theorem of SI , it is easy to see that  C(FPi ) for each i such that  FPi . Namely,
due to C3 and C4, the sameness of the general structures of FPi and C(FPi ) guarantees the
corresponding applicability of modus ponens, whereas, due to C5, substitutions, general-
izations and instantiations related to αn in a proof for FPi should be simply followed by
the application of the corresponding rules related to a2n−1 and a2n in the corresponding
proof for C(FPi ).
Having proved that according to C1–C5 each theorem of SP is translated into a theorem
of SI , it is still to be proved that no non-theorem of SP is translated into a theorem of SI .
Now, the two systems being consistent and complete, not  FPi entails ¬FPi for each i .
Therefore, C(¬FPi ), and so not C(FPi ).
What is proved, with the use of Lemma 1, for translations governed by C1–C5,
can be proved mutatis mutandis, by using Lemma 2, for the translations governed by
C∗1 –C∗5 , which means that SP and SI are syntactically trivially different in the general-
ized sense. ✷
Metatheorem 2. SP and SI are trivially different in the generalized sense in relation to
the two respective classes of their models.
Proof. The statement of the metatheorem follows directly from Definition 2 and Metathe-
orem 1. ✷
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3. The same formal system can be given completely different interpretations (e.g., it
can be about lines, atoms, people, etc.). A fortiori, two syntactically only trivially different
systems need not be semantically trivially different in relation to two respective interpreta-
tions. So, even if one is convinced by the reason cited in Section 1 that the two systems SP
and SI sketched in Section 2 are to be classified as syntactically trivially different (in the
generalized sense), he can still doubt that SP and SI , when interpreted as an instant time
system and a period time system respectively, should be considered as semantically triv-
ially different (in the generalized sense, too). In particular, he could argue that the two
intended models for SP and SI are just as relevantly different as intended models for any
two respective systems of two obviously different interpretations, because instants are not
periods and periods are not instants. So, he could conclude, after all, that though SP is
interpretable in the corresponding period time-structure after it has been translated into SI
and SI is interpretable in the corresponding instant time-structure after it has been trans-
lated into SP , we should not classify SP and SI as semantically trivially different (in the
generalized sense either).
If we want to avoid begging the question in this discussion about the philosophical
plausibility of generalizing the semantically trivial difference, technically introduced by
Definition 2 in Section 1, we need further, independent arguments.
On the one hand, the instant-based time ontologists can say that the time model for
SP should be accepted as the intended time model for SI too, because periods, formally
defined in Lemma 1 in Section 2 as ordered pairs of two distinct instants, are nothing else
but relations between two instants. On the other hand, the period-based time ontologists
can say that the time model for SI should be accepted as the intended time model SP
too, because instants, formally defined in Lemma 2 in Section 2 as ordered pairs of two
equivalence classes of abutting periods, are nothing else but relations between abutting
periods. The point is that according to the instant-based time ontology we do actually
speak about instants and their relations when we speak about periods and their relations
while according to the period-based time ontology we do actually speak about periods and
their relations when we speak about instants and their relations.
The difference between the ‘nothing-else-but’-claims of the instant-based time ontology
and the period-based time ontology would we annihilated through the ‘as-well-as’-claim
stating that we speak also about periods and their relations when we speak about instants
and their relations as well as we speak also about instants and their relations when we speak
about periods and their relations. According to the ‘as-well-as’-claim, the time model for
SP should be accepted as the intended time model for SI too, and also the time model
for SI should be accepted as the intended time model for SP too.
Now, I want to argue that Definition 2 in Section 1 is also philosophically vindicated,
because the ‘as-well-as’-claim is always plausible ceteris paribus. The argument is sim-
ple and not circular. If two systems are mutually translatable according to Definition 1,
all statements about a model for one of them are expressible as statements about the cor-
responding model for the other one and vice versa, so there can be no inherent reason
favouring one of the two formulable ‘nothing-else-but’-claims over the other. If two re-
lated ‘nothing-else-but’-claims are formulable in relation to two corresponding relational
structures but neither of the claims is favourable, then the corresponding ‘as-well-as’-claim
is vindicated. If the ‘as-well-as’-claim is vindicated, the intended model for one of the two
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corresponding systems is also the intended model for the other one and vice versa. If the
intended model for one of the two corresponding systems is the intended model for the
other one and vice versa, then the two systems are semantically trivially different.
The method used in defining the time model for SI in terms of a time model for SP
and vice versa can be applied to other time systems, independently of whether the time
is conceived as discrete, dense or continuous, open or closed, branching or not branch-
ing, finite or infinite.8 It is only the general applicability of this method by constructing
a pair of systems trivially different in the precisely defined generalized sense that vindi-
cates van Benthem’s proclamation that ‘systematic connections between point structures
and period structures enable one to use both perspectives at will’ [5, p. 84]. So, if the idea
of syntactically and semantically trivial differences is applicable in these cases too, it can
be said that what is the same in relation to any two time axiomatiozations that are triv-
ially different in the generalized sense is time topology. If so, it is this invariance in view
of topology that could be said to represent the positive account of the trivialization of the
semantical differences between the corresponding systems.
Consequently, one might expect that the ‘great struggle’ between the instant-based
and period-based ontologists will turn out to be ‘much ado about nothing’. However, it
must never be forgotten that the ‘as-well-as’-claim is plausible with certainty only un-
der ceteris paribus clause. For instance, one can wish to extend two systems, supposedly
trivially different in the generalized sense, by introducing predicates denoting some ex-
ternal properties attributable to instants and periods. Now, even if interval predicates in
one of the two systems and instants predicates in the other one are definable via instant
predicates and interval predicates respectively, it doesn’t follow that the resulting sys-
tems are such that the idea of trivial differences in the generalized sense is extendable
to them.9
The general lesson is that the answer to the question of whether the difference between
two axiomatized rival ontologies, or two formal theories in general, is to be considered
inessential or essential does not depend on whether the variables of the two systems can
ever range over the elements of one and the same basic set or not, but rather on the ap-
plicability of the concept of the syntactically and semantically trivial differences in the
generalized sense.
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